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Abstract
Notwithstanding the recognized importance of traders’ expectations in
characterizing the observed market dynamics, for instance the formation of
speculative bubbles and crashes on ﬁnancial markets, little attention has
been devoted so far by economists to a rigorous study of expectation forma-
tion in the laboratory.
In this work we describe a laboratory experiment on the emergence and
coordination of expectations in a pure exchange framework. We largely base
our study on previous experiments on expectation formation in a controlled
laboratory environment by Cars Hommes, Joep Sonnemans, Ian Tuinstra
and Henk van de Velden (2002a).
We consider a simple two asset economy with a riskless bond and a risky
stock. Each market is composed of six experimental subjects who act as
ﬁnancial advisors of myopic risk-averse utility maximizing investors and are
rewarded according to how well their forecasts perform in the market. The
participants are asked to predict not only the price of the risky asset at time
t + 1, as in Hommes et al. (2002a), but also the conﬁdence interval of their
prediction, knowing the past realizations of the price until time t ¡ 1. The
realized asset price is derived from a Walrasian market equilibrium equation,
unknown to the subjects, with feedback from individual forecasts. Subjects’
earnings are proportional to the increase in their wealth level. With respect
to previous experiments that did not include an explicit evaluation of risk
by participants, we observe a higher price volatility, a decreased likelihood
of bubble dynamics and, in general, a higher heterogeneity of predictions.
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1 Introduction
It is by now largely acknowledged that investors’ expectations play a key role in
the formation of speculative bubbles and crashes on ﬁnancial markets. However,
notwithstanding the recognized importance of trying to asses the dynamics that
govern the formation of expectations and their response to information and expe-
rience, little attention has been devoted so far by economists to a rigorous study
of expectation formation in the laboratory.
There are several experimental studies on asset markets (see, among others,
King et al. (1993), Noussair et al. (2000), Porter and Smith (1995), Smith
et al. (1988), Smith et al. (2000). However, most of these studies’ main focus
is the process of trading and the way in which trading activity itself may push
prices far above or below the asset’s fundamental value, although in several cases
information about the participants’ expectations is collected as well (see Sunder
(1995) for a review).
In this work we describe a simple laboratory experiment on the emergence and
coordination of expectations in a ﬁnancial market, in which no trading takes place
and in which subjects’ only task is to form predictions about the future return
of an asset and give a conﬁdence range of their prediction. We largely base our
study on a previous experiment of this type by Hommes et al. (2002a,b) on ex-
pectation formation in a controlled laboratory environment. In their experiment,
each market is composed of six experimental subjects who are asked to predict
the price of a risky asset at time t+1 knowing the past realizations of the price
until time t-1, the mean dividend at each period and the risk-free interest rate.
Subjects’ earnings are a function of their forecasting errors, and the realized asset
price is derived from an unknown market equilibrium equation with feedback from
individual forecasts. The authors ﬁnd out that in most markets prices diverge
signiﬁcantly from the (constant) fundamental value; moreover, speculative bub-
bles emerge endogenously due to positive feedback expectations. Finally, subjects
belonging to the same market tend to coordinate on a common prediction strategy.
We replicate their experimental design but changing some important features.
First and most importantly, we ask our subjects to predict not only the future
price of the asset, but also the conﬁdence interval of their prediction, which we use
as an estimate of the forecasted variance of the returns. In this way subjects are
asked to provide an estimation of the risk associated with their prediction and we
are recreating a framework that is more similar to the ones really faced by ﬁnancial
2advisors. We believe that adding information about the forecasted variance in the
model may aﬀect the dynamics observed in the experimental market compared to
the baseline case of Hommes et al. (2002a,b).
Secondly, in our experiments a subject’s earnings do not depend on his fore-
casting errors, but are proportional to the increase in the wealth level of a hypo-
thetical investor (played by the computer program) who makes trading decisions
according to a mean-variance approach taking as inputs the subjects’ forecasts and
acting with the time horizon of one step. In other words, experimental subjects
act as ﬁnancial advisors of myopic risk-averse utility maximizing investors and
are rewarded according to how well their forecasts perform in the market. This
experimental design allows us to focus exclusively on the dynamics of subjects’ ex-
pectations, as in the original experiment by Hommes et al; in fact, our subjects are
not engaged in any trading, which is done automatically by the computer program
on the basis of the predictions they provide; however, the payoﬀ assignment rule
that we adopt is more correspondent to what happens in real ﬁnancial markets,
where prediction accuracy only matters inasmuch as it leads to ‘correct’ trading
decisions.
Finally, we inform subjects of the positive feedback mechanism governing the
dynamics of price. In particular, subjects know that the price at time t is a
positive function of all market participants’ forecasted returns at time t + 1, and
a negative function of the forecasted variability of the predicted returns. Subjects
are also informed about the way in which the computer program calculates their
personal demand functions for shares on the basis of their predictions, and on
the nature of the asset pricing equation. In other words, subjects know that the
price level at each time step - and the corresponding return - is generated by their
own forecasting activity in a deterministic way. With such additional information,
there is the possibility for groups to coordinate on a common expectation strategy.
Section 2.1 and Section 3 respectively describe our model of asset pricing and
our experimental design and implementation. Section 4 discusses the results and
Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
As previously said, participants in our experiment are asked to act as ﬁnancial ad-
visors for mean-variance utility maximizer speculators with a short (one time step)
time horizon. We consider a simple economy with one risky stock paying constant
dividend D at each trading round and a riskless bond with a constant return R.
At each round of the experiment the participants are asked to provide prediction
for the risky asset price return in the next round, i.e. for the relative price increase
between the present and the next round, together with a conﬁdence interval for
3their prediction. The participants prediction are then used as inputs to drive the
investment decision of synthetic risk averse traders, played by the computer, that
ﬁnally determine the asset price at each time step. In this section we describe the
behavior of these synthetic traders in order to derive the explicit rules by which
the participants’ predictions about future returns do actually generate the present
price. We begin by describing the traders’ demand function following Bottazzi
(2002) and, afterward, see how these diﬀerent demand functions are merged to
obtain the asset pricing equation.
2.1 Personal demand function
Let W(t) be the trader wealth at the beginning of time t and let x the fraction of
wealth he wants to invest in the risky asset. If the price of the asset is p(t) and
A(t) is the number of possessed shares then W(t)x = p(t)A(t).
The future trader wealth (i.e. its wealth at the beginning of the next round)
depends on the future return on the stock price h(t) = p(t+1)=p(t)¡1 and reads
W(t + 1;h(t)) = xW(t)(h(t) ¡ R + D=p(t)) + W(t)(1 + R) (1)
where the dividends D are paid after the payment of the riskless interest R at the
end of round t.
We choose as the expression of the agent utility the simplest function of the
expected return and variance
U(t) = Et¡1[W(t + 1)] ¡
¯
2
Vt¡1[W(t + 1)] (2)
where Et¡1[:] and Vt¡1[:] stand respectively for the expected return and variance
computed at the beginning of round t, i.e. with the information available at time
t ¡ 1, and where ¯ is the “risk-aversion” parameter.
Using the expression for W in (1) one obtains
Et¡1[W(t + 1)] = xW(t)(Et¡1[h(t)] ¡ R + D=p(t)) + W(t)(1 + R) (3)
and
Vt¡1[W(t + 1)] = x
2 W(t)
2 Vt¡1[h(t)] : (4)
Substituting (3) and (4) in (2) one obtains
U(t) = xW(t)(Et¡1[h(t)]¡R+D=p(t))¡x
2 ¯
2
W(t)
2 Vt¡1[h(t)]+W(t)(1+R) (5)
whose maximum, remembering the deﬁnition of x provides the agent’s demand of
asset at times t, A(t) that reads
A(t) =
Et¡1[h(t)] ¡ R + D=p(t)
¯ Vt¡1[h(t)]p(t)
(6)
42.2 Aggregate demand and pricing equation
Consider a population of N heterogeneous traders. Let ¯i (with i 2 f1;:::;Ng)
the risk aversion of the i-th trader and Et¡1;i and Vt¡1;i respectively his forecasted
return and variance. If the total amount of risky asset is Atot its price can be
determined under the condition of reducing the excess demand to zero. One has
that the price p(t) must solve
N X
i=1
Et¡1;i ¡ R + D=p(t)
¯i Vt¡1;i p(t)
= Atot (7)
that reduces to a second order equation whose positive root reads
p(t) =
¯ Et¡1
2
+
sµ ¯ Et¡1
2
¶2
+ ¯ Dt¡1 (8)
where
¯ Et¡1 =
N X
i=1
Et¡1;i ¡ R
Atot ¯i Vt¡1;i
(9)
is an average expected excess return weighted with respect to the inverse risk and
¯ Dt¡1 =
N X
i=1
D
Atot ¯i Vt¡1;i
(10)
is the analogously weighted expected dividend.
Notice that (8) provide a positive price for the risky asset even if the average
expected excess return ¯ Et¡1 is negative. Note that the above pricing equation has
been obtained without considering any budget constraint for the agents. The Atot
can be reabsorbed in an overall rescaling of the parameter ¯i.
2.3 The skeleton of the experiment
We conducted experiments with a given number of subjects acting as advisors
for identical traders, in particular having an equal degree of risk aversion ¯. The
experiment structure can be roughly described as follows:
² each participant is asked to provide a range within which she predicts, with
a high degree of probability1, the future return will lay. Let ai;bi the range
provided by participant i 2 f1;:::;Ng.
1Roughly 95%, equivalent to the 2 standard deviation range of a normal distribution
5² for each participant range we compute the mid value and take it as an es-
timate of its forecasted return Ei = (bi + ai)=2. The forecasted variance of
player i is set to Vi = (bi ¡ai)2=4, i.e. the provided range is put equal to the
2 ¡ ¾ range of an (assumed) underlying normal distribution.
² (8) is used to ﬁx the present price p(t), then (6) is used to determine the
present market position of the synthetic trader, implied by the predictions
of i-th participant, Ai(t).
² once the present price is determined, from the trader’s position in the pre-
vious time step Ai(t ¡ 1) and from the past price p(t ¡ 1) it is possible to
determine the present value of her past position. The proﬁt earned by the
prediction of the i-th participant reads:
¼i(t) = Ai(t ¡ 1) (p(t) + D ¡ p(t ¡ 1)(1 + R)) (11)
Notice that the total number of assets and the synthetic traders’s degree of
risk aversion (as measured by the parameter ¯) can be used to tune the impact of
the forecasted variance on the price of the asset. At the end of the round t each
participant receives information about: the new price p(t), the new return h(t),
and the realized proﬁt from the previous round ¼t. In the next Section a detailed
description of the experimental design is provided.
3 The experimental design and implementation
The experiment was entirely computerized and it took place in one of the computer
rooms of the Computable and Experimental Economics Lab of the University of
Trento on May 7, 2003. We conducted two sessions of the experiment, with three
cohorts of 6 subjects each participating in the ﬁrst session and two cohorts of six
participants in the second session, for a total of 30 subjects, which were recruited
through ads posted at the various department buildings.
Subjects were mostly undergraduate students in economics and had never par-
ticipated in experiments of this type before. Before the experiment began, subjects
received paper copies of the instructions which were read aloud by the experimenter
to make sure that the rules of the market were common knowledge among partici-
pants2. In addition, a handout with a summary of the market functioning together
with the speciﬁcation of the relevant parameters was also given to every subject.
All subjects could see each other but were prevented from looking at each other’s
computer screens by wooden separators. They were told that they would partici-
pate in a ﬁnancial market composed of six participants in which their task was to
2A complete translation of the instructions given to subjects is available upon request.
6predict the expected price return of a hypothetical asset and its range of variability
for a total of 50 periods. Their earnings would depend on the increase in the value
of an initial endowment X that they would have at the beginning of every period.
Instructions explained to subjects how their given forecasts of the expected price
return at time t + 1 Ei(t + 1) and the conﬁdence interval Vi(t + 1) would be uti-
lized by the software to compute their personal demand function in every round,
and how the sum of the personal demand functions of all six participants would
determine the market price of the asset in period t. It was explained to subjects
that the range V would be the interval of values that according to them would
contain the forecasted return with a probability roughly equal to 95%.
Finally, instructions also explained that their earnings at the end of each period
would consist of the capital gain achieved (which of course depended on the realized
price return), the dividends paid and the ﬁxed interest rate R gained on the residual
of their endowment. It was made clear that there was no dependence between the
investment choices made in diﬀerent rounds, as a new, initial endowment X would
be available to them at the beginning of every period. In other words, subjects
acted as ﬁnancial advisors of diﬀerent investors, each of which acted as a mean-
variance optimizer with a time horizon of one step.
Subjects were told that their demand of shares could be negative or zero in
some rounds, meaning that they could hold short positions or invest all of their
endowment in the acquisition of bonds that would yield the riskless rate R. Their
ﬁnal earnings would be determined by the sum of their earnings in every round, and
converted into cash as follows: the participant within the group that had achieved
the highest cumulative payoﬀ would receive an amount of e25, while the partic-
ipant with the minimum cumulative payoﬀ would receive an amount of e5. All
other would get a payoﬀ proportional to the maximum achieved. Subjects were in-
formed of the payoﬀ assignment rule but did not have any information throughout
the experiment about other participants’ earnings, therefore such payoﬀ assign-
ment rule gave them the highest incentive to maximize their earnings. Finally,
although subjects knew that the market would be composed of six participants,
they did not know the identity of the other ﬁve participants.
Sessions lasted one hour and a half each. The initial endowment X was set
equal to 100 experimental schillings, the risk-less interest rate R was equal to 5%,
the dividend was equal to 3 schillings. Finally, the parameter ¯ and Atot were
ﬁxed respectively to the value of 100 and 1.
4 Results
In Fig. 1 we report the observed asset prices for the 5 diﬀerent groups together
with the asset fundamental value. As can be seen from the plots, price volatility
7is very high but, expect for the ﬁnal rounds of groups 3 and 5, it oscillates around
the fundamental value. Moreover, notice that the price increase observed in group
3 and 5 is inconsistent with an idea of rational bubble, since it does not display
the expected exponential growth. Hence, these can be plausibly interpreted as
“speculative” bubbles. Their appearance toward the end of the experiment is
probably due to a more ‘extremist’ behavior of some of the participants as the end
of the experiment is approaching.
The behavior of the asset price in our experiment is remarkably diﬀerent from
the one observed in Hommes et al. (2002a,b) with a higher volatility and a sub-
stantial lack of creation of relatively stable bubbles.
In Fig. 2 the autocorrelation structure of asset price returns for the 5 groups
is shown (bold line) together with the autocorrelation of expected returns. The
former is analogous in all groups except group 5, showing a tendency toward anti-
correlation at 1 time lag. As far as the forecasted returns are concerned, one
can notice that their autocorrelation structure is rather heterogeneous, with, how-
ever, a general tendency toward positive correlation, in contrast with the observed
structure in price returns.
The heterogeneity in the participants’ forecasts can be better judged from Fig. 3
and Fig. 4 that report the forecasted returns and forecasted variances of all the
participants. We have eliminated the very beginning and end of the experiment
in which some of the participants exhibit strange behaviors, probably due to lack
of learning in the former case and end-of-experiment eﬀects in the latter. As can
be seen, not only predictions are quite heterogeneous, but they do no display any
tendency to converge. Their volatility is group-speciﬁc, but it is in general very
high and stationary. Forecasted variances seem to exhibit a higher persistence, in
contrast to the forecasted returns. The more risk averse participants can be clearly
perceived, and seem to behave consistently over time.
Finally in Fig. 5 we report the lagged cross correlation between the agents
forecasted returns and the realized price returns. In this way one can analyze
both how participants take the past returns into account when formulating their
predictions, and how the participants’ predictions themselves impact on the asset
price. As expected, there is a strong correlation at lag 0. A high prediction of
tomorrow returns formulated today generates a price increase and, consequently,
a positive realized return today. Interestingly, the correlation between today’s
forecasts and tomorrow’s prices is negative, suggesting a tendency to over-react to
market ﬂuctuations. This is plausibly the reason of the observed 1 lag negative
autocorrelation in Fig. 2, i.e. of price “bouncing” dynamics. The correlation
structure between the participants’ predicted returns and past price returns is
extremely heterogeneous and only a low degree of persistence can be observed in
some cases.
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In this paper we have described a simple asset pricing experiment in which par-
ticipants must forecast both the expected future price return of an asset and its
variance. Our results show that, with respect to previous experiments in which
subjects had to predict only the future price value, - and the pricing equation was
linear with positive feedbacks from individual predictions - we ﬁnd no evidence of
coordination on common expectations, no evidence of persistent speculative bub-
bles, and a high volatility in the realized price around the asset’s fundamental
value. We suggest that it is the nonlinear structure of our pricing equation to de-
termine such dynamics; in fact, the inclusion of the forecasted variance determines
a dynamic by which small changes in the predicted conﬁdence range determine
large ﬂuctuations in the realized price, which in turn makes it very diﬃcult for
subjects to coordinate on a common strategy. Note that in our model we adopted
the simplifying assumption of an equal degree of risk aversion for our subjects. Fu-
ture experiments should aim at introducing further heterogeneity by taking into
account the - presumably - diﬀerent risk attitudes of the participants in the exper-
imental market. Taken together, our results conﬁrm the importance of the market
institutional details - and in particular the nature of the expectations feedback
structure - in determining the observed market dynamics.
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Figure 1: Price history for the 5 groups.
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Figure 2: Returns autocorrelogram for the 5 groups.
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Figure 3: Forecasted returns for the 5 groups. Each line corresponds to the forecast
of one agent.
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Figure 4: Forecasted variances for the 5 groups. Each line corresponds to the
forecast of one agent.
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Figure 5: Cross-correlogram between agents forecasted returns and realized re-
turns.
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